I. INTRODUCTION
Since 1935, the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) has provided the framework for unionization in the United States. Many organizers and 1 lawmakers have blamed coercive employers for the decline of union membership in recent years. For these detractors of the current labor situation 2 in the United States, the NLRA itself provides the source of the coercion.
3
Coupled with this problem is the NLRA's inherent inability to guarantee solutions for labor disputes. 4 Under the NLRA, union organizers can request a representation election when at least thirty percent of the workforce signs authorization cards in what is known as a "card check." At this point in the process, the employer can 5 choose to forego the election and simply recognize the union as a bargaining unit, or can choose to move forward with the election. The election is 6 conducted via a secret ballot, and the union will be certified if it receives support from a majority of the workers. Despite the ability to vote in private, 7 many union proponents are concerned with the activity that can occur during 148 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:147 8. 153 CONG. REC. E463-01 (2007) ; see also CONG. REC. E456-02 (2007) . 9. 153 CONG. REC. S8276-01, 8277 (2007) . 10. Id. 11. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d). 12. Id. 13. 29 U.S.C. § 163 ("Nothing in this Act . . . shall be construed so as either to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike or to affect the limitations or qualifications on that right.").
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the vast amount of time prior to the actual election. On average, it takes two 8 years to complete a National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) election. Union 9 supporters see two problems with this large gap: ample time for anti-union employer coercion, and a general loss of interest on the part of the employees due to frustration with the system.
10
If a union is successfully formed at a workplace, the NLRA mandates that the union and the employer bargain collectively. " [T] o bargain collectively 11 is the performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment . . . ." Despite this obligation, some disputes may not be settled 12 in this manner. When mere negotiation cannot bring the two sides into accordance, a strike is an option that is protected by the NLRA. Other than 13 this recognition, the NLRA does not specifically set forth any other means for settling disputes between employers and their organized labor force. 14 Although strikes can be an effective means of ending disputes, they are costly to both the employer and the employees. With a lack of palatable options available when disputes arise, the current NLRA provides a flawed framework for handling the delicate relationship that often exists between employers and employees.
Because of these problems, it is easy to see why changes to the current NLRA have been proposed. Such proposals have sparked harsh political debate, as they reflect a controversial split between Democrats and Republicans. However, in addition to the ideological arguments for and against changes, the debate also includes fundamental constitutional arguments that invoke speech, privacy, and property rights. For detractors of the changes, these arguments should prevent the passage of any legislation, or should warrant an overturning of that legislation if it ever passes into law.
This Note addresses the legal ramifications that could result from the passage of the Employee Free Choice Act, a specific piece of proposed legislation that seeks to cure the problems that many have with the NLRA. Section II discusses this legislation and explains the changes that it would make to the NLRA. Section III examines the constitutional arguments that may prevent the legislation from surviving challenges following its possible passage. Section IV analyzes these arguments using past precedent and ultimately concludes that all of the questioned provisions of the legislation would survive judicial challenges. Section V brings the Note to a conclusion. Section 2 would amend § 9(c) of the NLRA by adding a provision that allows a union to be certified without an NLRB election. Specifically, the 26 Act states that the NLRB will investigate a petition to obtain union representation if the petition alleges that a majority of employees support the representation. The Act goes on to state that if the Board determines that a 27 majority of employees have indeed signed "valid authorizations," the Board shall not certify an NLRB election, but shall certify the labor organization.
II. THE EMPLOYEE FREE CHOICE ACT

28
In other words, the Act would permit union certification if a majority of employees signed valid authorization cards and only would require an election if at least thirty percent, but less than fifty percent of employees signed cards. This is a stark contrast to the current NLRA framework, which 29 permits the employer to decide whether or not an election should take place when a majority of signatures has been obtained. This provision also vastly 30 limits the power of employers to influence the union selection process since the lengthy time before elections will be removed; a time in which employers 31 can present their side of the unionization argument.
32
Section 3 would amend § 8 of the NLRA by adding a provision that mandates arbitration in the collective bargaining of the first contract if the two parties are unable to reach an agreement. First, the Act lays out a procedure 33 to follow after a bargaining unit is initially certified. Once a union is certified, the two sides should meet within ten days to bargain collectively and must bargain in good faith, putting forth their best effort to reach an agreement.
34
If the two parties cannot reach an agreement after ninety days, either party is free to contact the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (Service this point, the Service will contact the parties and assist with the negotiations, but will not directly adopt a contract.
36
Finally, under § 3, a thirty day clock begins to toll after the Service is contacted. If the parties haves not agreed upon a contract after that thirty day 37 period of mediation, the Act explains that the dispute will be sent to an arbitrator. That arbitrator then has the power to settle the dispute by creating 38 a contract, which will be in effect for two years (unless a different time is agreed upon by both parties). In other words, if the two parties ultimately 39 cannot reach an agreement, the Act provides that the federal government, not the employer, will have the power to set the wages and other employment benefits of a company's union employees.
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III. OPPOSITION
Criticisms of Section 2
Detractors of the Act argue that reliance on "card check" in § 2 violates two major constitutional rights. These opponents argue that this section abridges the employers' First Amendment right to freedom of speech. The 41 opponents also argue that § 2 strips employees of their Constitutional right to privacy.
42
In regard to the violation of an employer's free speech rights, opponents of the Act cite the elimination of the secret ballot elections as the source of the problem. Under the current NLRA, significant time often stands between the 43 request for an NLRB election and the time when the election actually takes place. During this time, many employers take the opportunity to speak out 44 against the formation of the union by explaining the possible and probable consequences that would result from a unionized workforce. With regard to the violation of an employee's right to privacy, opponents cite the coercion and pressure inherent in the card check process as the source of the problem. Under the current NLRA, a secret ballot election is likely to 50 occur at the request of the employer even if a majority of employees sign. As 51 a result, regardless of whether or not an employee signs the card, he or she will still have the opportunity to vote his or her true feelings in privacy. Practically, this means that, should union leaders apply any form of pressure toward employees; these employees have the option of acquiescing at the time, but later voting differently when their identity is shielded. Furthermore, this same logic also applies to employers who pressure employees not to support the union. Withdrawing support in public, but voting in favor of the union in private, is an available strategy under the current NLRA.
While these arguments represent strong policy questions surrounding the Act, the question that remains is whether or not the reliance on card check violates an employee's Constitutional right to privacy. Opponents of the Act 52 ultimately fear that union leaders will begin to apply pressure to holdout employees as the number of signed cards reaches a majority. feel that a private ballot, free of coercion, is essential to the process, and given how much the decision will affect each employee's life, they feel that the absence of the secret ballot election is a violation of the employees' Constitutional right to privacy. Since citizens of this country are provided the 54 protection of a secret ballot when selecting leaders, opponents argue that the same protection unquestionably applies to the election of union leadership. 
Criticisms of Section 3
The Constitutional questions surrounding the mandatory arbitration requirements in Section 3 of the Act focus mainly on the rights that are taken away from employers as a result. "The idea that an arbitrator would be able to set wages for two years should give pause to every employer. Simply stated, an outsider determines fundamental issues such as wages, benefits and working conditions." In addition to questions of fairness, opponents of the 56 Act argue that stripping the employer of the power to set wages and other benefits is unconstitutional. These detractors argue that the Act violates the 57 Fourteenth Amendment protection against the taking of property without compensation and the freedom to contract. Given that unsuccessful contracts 58 can lead to the economic downturn of a business, taking away the right to contract is the equivalent of the government taking away a valuable piece of property without compensation. Furthermore, any taking of this property 59 right is only constitutional if the government provides due process to the entity that is losing the property. Opponents, like California Representative George 60 Radanovich, also argue that the Act lacks any of the procedural safeguards, such as the right to notice and to present evidence, necessary to ensure that the businesses receive due process. these contractual decisions, opponents of the Act view it as a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
IV. LEGAL ANALYSIS
First Amendment Claims
The First Amendment prohibits the federal government from abridging a person's right to free speech. The United States Supreme Court has 63 examined the issue of whether or not the elimination of secret ballot elections violates an employer's right to free speech. In NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 64 the Court scrutinized three separate instances of grievances that were filed against employers for unfair labor practices. In each case, the union 65 embarked on an organizational campaign and managed to obtain a majority of card signatures from the employees. The employers also put forth "vigorous 66 antiunion campaigns" that resulted in numerous unfair labor practice charges due to the coercive and threatening nature of the campaigns. In each 67 instance, NLRB elections were either not held, or their results were thrown out because of the unfair labor practices of the employers. As a result, the 68 unions sought certification from the card signatures alone, and the employers argued against that certification on numerous grounds. One of those grounds 69 was that the cards were insufficient to determine the true will of the employees because "an employer has not had a chance to present his views and thus a chance to insure that the employee choice was an informed one."
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This contention mirrors the First Amendment argument, as both seek an answer to the question of whether or not sole reliance on the card check process violates an employer's fundamental speech right.
The Court answered the free speech question in a manner that was specifically tailored to the cases at that time. It acknowledged that, under the 71 NLRA, employers have the right to insist on an election unless they commit unfair labor practices that are "likely to destroy the union's majority and seriously impede the election." In fact, the Court acknowledged the 72 superiority of elections over the card check process, but noted that "where an employer engages in conduct disruptive of the election process, cards may be the most effective-perhaps the only-way of assuring employee choice."
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As a result, the Court reasoned that, in order for these unfair labor practices to take place, the union would first have to be aware that the certification campaign was taking place. It also observed that oftentimes, it is the union 74 who informs the employers of the campaign in order to subject them to the unfair labor practice provisions, thus allowing them to proceed without an election. Given this knowledge, and the anti-union campaigns that resulted 75 in the unfair labor practices, the Court reasoned that under the current NLRA, employers have ample time to speak their minds, even without an election, because this speech ultimately could lead to certification via card check only.
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Despite this apparent approval of the card check process, the Court's analysis would be overruled by the passage of the Act because a majority of signatures allows the union to bypass an election regardless of whether unfair labor practices take place. As a result, the absence of an election would no 77 longer mean that, by definition, the employer has spoken out against the union. Fortunately, for proponents of the Act, the Court addressed the issue of notice and opportunity to speak without incorporating unfair labor practices into the analysis. For instance, in National Labor Relations Board v. Gissel
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Packing Company, the union's demand for recognition occurred only one week prior to the outset of the campaign. The Court held that the employer 79 had sufficient time to influence the situation despite this short period because "the employer was able to deliver a speech before the union obtained a majority." This analysis implies that the employer does not have the right to 80 speak out during the specific time period before an NLRB election takes place. Instead, this shows that the employer simply has the right to speak out against the union at some point in time.
When this analysis is applied to the First Amendment argument against the Act, it is apparent that the argument would fail. By passing the Act, the government would not be taking away the right of an employer to speak out against a union. The government simply would be taking away a time period which allows employers to speak out. It is hard to imagine a situation where 81 union supporters would be able to hide a certification drive from an employer. While it is true that some solicitation would take place outside of work, it is also true that recruiting will be done, to some degree, on the premises.
Employers may see organizers, may overhear employees discussing union issues, or may be directly informed about the organizational drive by the employees. In any of those situations, the employer is put on notice of the existence of the drive. The moment that an employer learns of such a drive, that employer is free to present the reasons why the union should not be formed. This is a freedom that will not be taken away by the Act.
In the rare instances where the campaign remains a secret, there is nothing in the Act that prevents an employer from routinely communicating with employees about the potential negative effects of union formation at that particular workplace. If an employer believes that the business would suffer and possibly fold under union control, it is in management's best interest to inform the employees of these reasons. This type of preemptive strike is currently well within an employer's rights and will not be taken away by the Act.
For these reasons, it is highly unlikely that the free speech argument would be successful. The Act simply eliminates a specific period of time when employers often speak out against unions, not an employer's right to speak out against a union altogether. 
Employee Privacy Claims
Although a right to privacy is not expressly mentioned in the Constitution, it has been inferred from numerous amendments such as the First Amendment, the Third Amendment, the Fourth Amendment, the Fifth Amendment, and the Ninth Amendment. Opponents argue that this right to 83 privacy is being taken away by the Act's reliance on card check. Under this reasoning, opponents of the Act cannot argue that relying on the card check process violates an employee's right to privacy. If privacy never existed, it is impossible for the government to take it away. However, the Court's analysis is questionable when applied to practical situations.
The Court assumes that a union would know how the employees voted even if the votes were cast in private. This assumption is based upon the 89 knowledge of voter sentiment, as well as, presumably, the results of the election itself. What these assumptions fail to acknowledge is the argument 90 that employees may express support for the union during the card drive, but vote against it during the election. Unions not only have a reputation of assisting employees, but also have a reputation of using intimidation to enlist support. In the face of pressure that could range from embarrassment in front of fellow employees to threats of physical or financial harm, it is not hard to imagine that some employees may agree to support the union in public, but then rescind that support in the privacy of a voting booth. In these cases, even the sentiment of an apparently staunch supporter could not be accurately tracked. In other words, although union organizers may factor one's public sentiment and card signature into their approval numbers, they never can truly know for sure which employees voted as expected. Justice Kennedy acting as a swing vote between the two ideologies. Of the four Justices over the age of seventy, the possible retirements of conservative Justice Scalia and moderate Justice Kennedy would allow President Obama to dramatically shift the balance of power. However, even without this shift, the lack of a solid conservative majority makes it unlikely that former precedent will be ignored in favor of overturning a liberal piece of legislation. For this reason, the employee free speech argument stands some chance of success. Union organizers may like to believe that they can determine how each employee will vote, but given the coercive nature of many organizational drives, such predictability is highly unlikely. As a result, employees currently enjoy some type of privacy via the secret ballot election process, a privacy that would be taken away by the Act. However, as it stands now, the Supreme Court does not recognize this privacy at all. Even though there is a compelling argument that the Act takes away a fundamental employee right, opponents will have the daunting task of overturning the existing precedent. In the end, 91 it is this precedent that makes a successful challenge unlikely.
Fourteenth Amendment Claims
The Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution provides that no state shall deny any person of "life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." Regarding the mandatory arbitration principle of the Act and its The system of compulsory arbitration which the Act establishes is intended to compel, and if sustained will compel, the owner and employees to continue the business on terms which are not of their making. . . . Such a system infringes the liberty of contract and rights of property guaranteed by the due process of law clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
